Understanding how transient fiscal distress affects the stability and distribution of local budgets is increasingly important as control of public spending and revenues becomes more decentralized. This paper exploits the large and unexpected shock to county budgets imposed by capital crime trials, first to understand the incidence of the cost of capital convictions, and second to uncover the effects of local fiscal distress on the level and distribution of public spending and revenues. I show that these trials are quite costly relative to county budgets (with each trial causing an increase in county spending of more than $2 million), and that the costs are borne primarily by increasing taxes (although perhaps partially by decreases in police and capital spending). Using these trials as a source of exogenous variation, I also find significant inter-jurisdictional spillovers of both spending and revenues.
I.

INTRODUCTION
States and localities have a limited set of instruments at their disposal to weather fiscal shocks, and how effective they are at doing so is not well understood. Insight into how transient fiscal distress affects state and local budgets seems particularly important in light of the increasing decentralization of public spending through many different programs. This paper takes advantage of an unusual source of fiscal distress to investigate empirically local reactions to shortrun fiscal shocks. Trying a capital crime case is a large and unexpected expense for a county, with the estimated cost of a death penalty case over $2 million (Dieter, 1994) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that counties respond with a mix of expenditure cuts and tax hikes. For example, when Jasper County, Texas tried three men in the dragging death of James Byrd, the county auditor said that the county raised property taxes by 8 percent to pay for the trial and delayed new computer purchases and construction. I explore this source of variation to determine which areas of local budgets absorb the shocks, the spillover effects of the budget changes, and where the ultimate incidence of financing capital convictions lies. Through this analysis of local responses to short-run shocks, we gain insight into the decision-making process that determines local spending and revenues. The ability of local governments to change their expenditures and revenues and to shift funds between categories plays a crucial role in determining the distribution of public spending both within and between jurisdictions.
This research builds on several strands of the public economics literature, including the effect of fiscal institutions on states' and localities' ability to respond to shocks (see Poterba, 1994, and Cullen, 2003) , the effect of one state's spending on the spending of neighboring states (see Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993 , Besley and Case, 1995 , Figlio, Van Kolpin, and Reid, 1999 , and Baicker, 2004 , and the effect of selective migration and population composition on the public bundle (see Poterba, 1997 , Borjas and Hilton, 1996 , Meyer, 1998 , and Levine and Zimmerman, 1999 . There is a wide literature on the "flypaper effect," or the tendency of shocks to be disproportionately absorbed in the budget in which they originate, rather than being spread across all categories according to marginal propensities to consume -although there are many potential explanations for such observed behavior (see Hines and Thaler, 1995 , Strumpf, 1998 , Baicker, 2001 , and Knight, 2002 . Together this research suggests the important but complex role that local responses to fiscal distress may play in the ultimate distribution of spending and resources.
I begin by showing that the cost of capital convictions is large and unpredictable. I find that counties bear this unexpected burden primarily by raising taxes and in part by decreasing expenditures on police, while health and welfare spending seem to be maintained. The estimated increase in taxes and expenditures is significant for large and small counties alike, potentially amounting to more than $5.5 billion over a 20-year period. These convictions have effects beyond county borders: using capital convictions as an instrument for neighboring counties' spending and revenues shows that when one county raises tax rates, neighboring counties, apparently freed from competitive constraints, do so as well. These findings have implications not just for the real incidence of the cost of capital convictions, but also for the relationship between local shocks and the total bundle of resources available to different segments of the population.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In order to investigate the effects of fiscal distress on local spending we need to identify some exogenous source of budgetary stress not driven by political or economic conditions that may affect spending and revenue more broadly. It is insufficient (and potentially misleading) merely to examine the relationships between different categories of spending without abstracting from these conditions. In order to uncover causal relationships, rather than correlations, it is necessary to find shocks to local budgets that are unexpected and uninfluenced by things like the local economic climate. Capital crime trials provide just such a source of financial stress.
Background on Capital Crime Trials
Trying capital murder cases can pose a significant financial burden on localities (see Dieter, 1994 , for a review). An Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations report (1993, p. 24) notes that court systems in most states "receive less than a third of their budgets from the state. In most systems, counties provide the remaining funds." Costs for seeing a case through to a death sentence are estimated at more than $2 million, with some estimates ranging as high as $7 million to execution (Cook, 1993, and Burnett, 1999) . This is as much as 10 times more than life in prison, and most of these costs accrue at the trial level, contrary to much public discourse about the cost of "endless appeals" (Dieter) . Since nine out of ten defendants in capital crime trials are indigent, counties must often pay legal costs for both prosecution and defense (Moneyline, 1995) . This represents a substantial fraction of county budgets. The median county had a $12 million budget in 1997, while the tenth percentile spent $2 million. (The distribution of county spending is shown in Figure 1 .) In 1991 NJ spent $16 million to impose the death penalty, and the next year the state laid off 500 police officers because they could not afford to pay them (Dieter) . The burden that these expenses impose has fueled a public debate about the effectiveness of capital convictions in deterring crime and on whom the burden of paying for them should fall. Counties in many states complain of the financial hardships the trials impose. Jasper County, Texas claims to have already raised property taxes by 8 percent to pay for the trial of the three men accused of killing James Byrd, and will have to delay new computer purchases and construction (Burnett) . According to the Jasper County Auditor (as reported by Gold, 2002) , the county has already spent more than a million dollars (including 28 percent on defense attorneys, 17 percent on salary for extra prosecutors, and 16 percent on jury expenses, courthouse security, and the court reporter). Another Texas county tried to raise taxes to pay for a high-profile capital trial and the taxpayers revolted and voted for a tax rollback, which forced the county commissioners to cut funding to fire and ambulance services in the county, while another case caused a border dispute between counties trying to avoid the cost of a particular trial (Dieter) . Jasper County, Mississippi (no relation) spent three times more on a capital trial in 1995 than it spent on its libraries, and, lacking even parking meters to raise revenue, had to increase property and automobile taxes to raise the funds (Moneyline). Dieter reports several more examples:
In Lincoln County, Georgia . . . the county commissioners refused to pay the defense costs when the attorney won a new trial for a death row inmate [and] were sent to jail.
[The] chair of the County Commission explained: "We're a rural county of 7,500 people with a small tax base. We had to raise taxes once already for this case when it was originally tried, and now we are going to have to raise taxes again. It's not fair." (p. 6) Quitman County, the poorest in Mississippi . . . had to raise taxes and borrow money to try [two cases]. [The county clerk says] 'I'm thinking we'll become even poorer and I'm also thinking that a lot of people are going to move out of the county because of the increased tax burden and move over to other counties where the taxes are not quite as high.' Gold (2002) reports that Quitman county took out loans and raised taxes a total of three times. "Now, the county is having trouble attracting a new tenant to a vacant warehouse because it has higher property taxes than any nearby county." Kolbert (2001) reports that the cost of security alone in one trial in New York prompted the county to impose a sales tax.
Clearly, however, states choose to enact capital punishment statutes and prosecutors choose to pursue capital cases, so there must be some utility to a conviction (given the presence of a capital crime). The first question is whether or not a capital conviction provides a localized stream of benefits. To the extent that the residents of a community benefit from a sense of justice accomplished or from reductions in future crimes, the price tag associated with the trial is not equivalent to a pure reduction in income. The evidence of a deterrent effect of capital punishment overall is weak, however, and the size of the deterrence benefit that would accrue to the locality that pursues the conviction seems small.
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That said, if local residents gain utility from the prosecution, then we might expect to see the shock accommodated disproportionately by some reduction in spending on close substitutes, rather than through the same bundle of goods that a shock to unrestricted income would affect.
The second question is whether or not county finances affect the decision to pursue a capital sentence. There are several points in the trial and sentencing process at which there is great prosecutorial discretion. After a crime is committed and an arrest made, the prosecutor chooses the charge for which the defendant will stand trial. This charge (for example, "capital murder" versus "first degree murder") determines whether or not a capital conviction is even possible. After the charge is made, the defendant chooses whether to enter into a plea bargain or continue on to trial. Here, again, the prosecutor has discretion over whether or not to accept a plea to a lesser charge (with a non-death sentence). Thus, if prosecutors are influenced by the economic circumstances faced by their county, they would have several opportunities to avoid an expensive death penalty trial.
Accounts in the popular press suggest that this is not the case. Gold reports that "Costs notwithstanding, county officials say they pursue the death penalty when the crime warrants it." Furthermore, a judge in Ohio recently ruled (after being ordered to review the case by the appeals court) that costs could not prevent a prosecutor from seeking the death penalty (AP, 2002) . I further explore this issue empirically below.
While these cases are quite expensive, contrary to the impression given by much media coverage they are fairly uncommon. Over the period used in this analysis, 1983 to 1999, 77 percent of counties saw no such convictions. This seems like an insurable risk, and we might expect some form of intergovernmental risk sharing. Indeed, several states (such as Utah, Texas, Idaho, Wyoming, Washington, and Mississippi) have implemented or are currently considering legislation to offset local costs, but, perhaps because of lags 1 See McManus (1985) , Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003), and Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepard (2003) for mixed evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 2 While "speedy trial" provisions generally limit the lag between arrest and a formal charge being made, the time between when a charge is made and when a conviction occurs is often as long as 18 months to 2 years (Dieter) . in adapting to the increasing financial burden, during the period of study few such reimbursements occurred.
This anecdotal evidence suggests that the effects of paying for these trials should be discernable in county budgets. It also suggests that we pay particular attention to local taxes, and to capital and police protection expenditures. By examining the effects of paying for these extraordinary and often unexpected expenses on local finances, we may gain valuable insight into the effects of exogenous increases in local expenditures and taxes, as well as a better understanding of the incidence of this expensive policy.
Estimation Framework
A simple economic model would predict that the cost of a negative windfall would be borne based on the marginal propensity to consume public goods and private goods out of income. Given the low fraction of personal income devoted to county budgets (less than 3 percent in this period), we would expect the bulk of the costs to be borne by increased taxes, and potentially smoothed over time by borrowing. (See Hines and Thaler, 1995, for evidence that many shocks tend to be absorbed disproportionately within closely related budget categories, known as the "flypaper effect.") I estimate the effect of paying for a capital crime conviction on total revenues, total spending, and spending on specific public goods.
Several different models are estimated here, but each includes county effects (α i ), time effects (β t ), demographic and economic controls including population, murder rates, crime rates, and employment rates (X it ), and some also include a state-specific time trend or state-specific time dummies. The dependent variable is spending on a particular category or tax revenue from a particular source, and the independent variable of interest is the presence of a capital conviction.
We might want to limit the analysis to counties with few of these trials (so that they are least expected), to counties in states with the death penalty (using just counties in death-penalty states, as opposed to all counties without a case, as controls), or to smaller counties (which may have less of a cushion and potentially even higher variable costs). I also present analysis using a log specification, but since we would like to put a dollar price tag on the cost of capital convictions I begin with this model.
III.
DATA
All analysis is performed at the county-year level. Data come from several different publicly available sources.
County Budgets
County budget data come from two sources. The first is the Census of Governments, conducted every 5 years by the Bureau of the Census, and the second is the Annual Survey of Government Finances, conducted most years on a sample of county governments. County government data are used, rather than aggregations of all sub-governments to the county-area level. There are several logistical difficulties involved in using these data, some of which can be overcome and some of which cannot. Disaggregation in the early years is limited, and in some years missing observations and 0 values are indistinguishable. The number of counties in the survey is around 2100 for years before 1992 and 1500 in the years after.
Capital Convictions
The National Corrections Reporting Program surveys all inmates admitted to correctional facilities and is available annually from 1983 to 1999. It includes information on the county and date of conviction as well as the severity of the sentence. From this information I have compiled the number of prisoners admitted to prison under sentence of death by county by year. Because the survey is limited to inmates, those acquitted in capital trials will be omitted from the analysis. 3 The source of variation I use is therefore the presence of a capital conviction. While data on the fraction of capital trials leading to convictions is not readily available, a Department of Justice study of the 75 largest counties in 1998 found that 77 percent of murder trials (capital and otherwise) resulted in convictions.
While the NCRP survey has much detail on the individual prisoners and their sentences, it has only sentencing dates, not the time span of the trial itself. Capital trials can often take more than a year, so a prison admission in year t may very well affect county budgets in year t-1. While we can use the data to help inform us about the proper time horizon, this timing noise is likely only to bias results towards zero. Several states do not participate in the survey in several years. Again, these missing observations should not bias the results.
The data are summarized in Table 1 . There is a great deal of variation between counties in the number of prisoners convicted of capital crimes. Over the 20 years sampled, most counties (more than 77 percent) had no death penalty convictions and more than 11 percent had exactly 1 year with a death penalty conviction between 1983 and 1999. 4 Thus, for the vast majority of counties these convictions are rare occurrences. Of course, some large counties have several convictions each year. While costs for frequent capital conviction counties may still be variable, they are bound to be more anticipated. Furthermore, the (relatively fixed) cost is likely to be a bigger shock to smaller counties, which have a smaller tax base and are less likely to have the requisite personnel already on staff. Even for larger counties (those over 100,000) these events are relatively rare: 56 percent had none, and 14 percent had only 1. (Fortunately, from our perspective, they are still common enough to provide ample observations for estimation: more than 1,600 county-years saw at least one capital conviction.)
Prosecutors' Election Cycles
In 2001, the Bureau of Justice Statistics completed a survey of the universe of county prosecutors. The survey included questions about the length of the term of office for each prosecutor and when each prosecutor had begun to serve. From these answers, I have imputed the prosecutorial election cycle for each county. Spot checks of individual counties using news reports of election results validate the imputation method. Surprisingly, election years are not constant within states, although the length of term of office is. (For example, in many states a new prosecutor is elected whenever the current prosecutor retires.) The modal term of office is 4 years, and election years are roughly evenly distributed. Prosecutors are elected in all but five states (Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island). 5 In those states, county prosecutors are appointed by (elected) state prosecutors.
Covariates
County covariates are available from several sources. The County and City Data Book, published annually by the Bureau of the Census, includes variables at the county-year level such as median age, personal income, land area, population, and unemployment. Further demographic breakdowns (such as population by race) are available only in the decennial census years. County-level crime rates (both murders and an index of "serious crimes") come from the Department of Justice Uniform Crime Reports.
IV. RESULTS
Predictability of Capital Convictions
One possible concern with the use of capital trials as an exogenous shock is that a prosecutor may have discretion over whether or not to charge a defendant with a capital crime, and that his or her decision may be influenced by the financial circumstances of the jurisdiction. If prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty when counties are in difficult financial straits (when revenues and expenditures may be down), that would bias up estimates of the effect of capital convictions on spending and revenues (although the inclusion of controls for economic conditions and demographics helps mitigate this bias). The anecdotal evidence cited above suggests that this is not the case, and while this proposition is difficult to test rigorously, there are several pieces of evidence that strongly suggest that capital convictions are not driven by local economic or political conditions.
The first piece of evidence comes from a simple comparison of the economic conditions in counties that have a capital conviction in the subsequent period and those that do not. Table 2 shows these results. Counties with a capital conviction in the following year look virtually identical to those that will not see such a conviction, with equal deficit levels. Looking at the evidence another way, the probability of having a capital conviction is 5.23 percent in counties with a deficit last period, and 5.12 percent in counties without (with a chi-squared test yielding a 70 percent probability that these are the same).
A more rigorous exploration of the probability of having a capital conviction based on all of the covariates described above yields similar results. A probit estimation of the effect of running a deficit on the probability of a death penalty conviction in the subsequent period, including state and year fixed effects and covariates, yields an insignificant coefficient of .01 (with a standard error of .04), while a linear model of the effect of deficits (measured in real per capita dollars) on the number of convictions in the subsequent year yields an insignificant coefficient (in millionths) of -1.6 (with a standard error of 1.5). 6 Note that if we repeat these tests for the set of smaller counties analyzed below (those with fewer than 75,000 residents and fewer than 3 years with a death penalty conviction in the sample) we get similar results: -.04 (s.e. .05) for the probit specification and (in millionths) -.89 (s.e. 2.1) for the linear specification.
Ideally we could find a source of exogenous variation in the presence of capital convictions. One candidate is the prosecutorial election cycle.
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If prosecutors are more likely to seek the death penalty in years in which they are up for re-election or re-appointment, then we can use variation in the election cycle to identify and abstract from any economic factors that might influence both the presence of a death penalty conviction and local spending. As Table 2 shows, however, counties with and without prosecutors whose term is up are equally likely to have a death penalty conviction. If we regress the presence of a death penalty conviction on all of the covariates above, whether or not a prosecutor's term is up, and the interaction of that term variable with whether a prosecutor is appointed or elected, we are still unable to predict the presence of a capital conviction. The R 2 from a linear probability model is .06 (even including time and county fixed effects), and the coefficient on the prosecutor election cycle variable is indistinguishable from 0. 8 (It is worth noting that the prosecutorial election cycle also seems to have no independent effect on spending (judicial or otherwise) -and including these prosecutor variables as covariates in the regressions below does not change the estimated coefficients.
9 ) Thus, all available evidence suggests that the presence of a capital conviction is quite unpredictable based on a wide variety of factors. I next examine the effect of the presence of a conviction on county spending and revenues. Table 3 presents estimates of equations (1) and (2) above. I focus on total expenditures, corrections and judicial expenditures, and total revenues. More detailed reported budget categories at the county level are sufficiently heterogeneous and inconsistently categorized that it is not clear exactly where the expenditures associated with the trials would appear, and further disaggregation of the data results in many missing observations. Capital convictions appear on the right-hand side as a dummy variable indicating the presence of an admission 7 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. Other possible sources of variation include the existence of capital punishment in the state at all -such as the legality of capital punishment, whether or not anyone has been put to death in the state, or the number of prisoners on death row. These variable produce even weaker first stages. 8 Similar results are obtained using a probit specification or substituting the number of death penalty convictions for the indicator variable reported here. 9 These prosecutorial election variables would thus not serve as good instruments for the presence of capital convictions in a regression of spending or revenues on capital convictions for both theoretical and practical reasons: first, there would be no first stage; second, even if there were, we would be concerned in theory that the prosecutorial election cycle is correlated with other political variables that would affect budgets independent of capital convictions, although this does not seem to be the case in practice.
Capital Convictions and Spending
under sentence of death in year t or year t+1 (although I show results for a continuous measure of the number of convictions below).
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The presence of a death penalty conviction has a significant effect on expenditures, coming through judicial and corrections spending. The presence of such a conviction increases judicial and corrections spending (and total spending) by more than $2 million, which is quite consistent with outside estimates of the cost of a death penalty case.
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Controls in all columns include population, population density, the murder rate, the uniform crime report index of serious crimes, and county and year fixed effects. Column (3) excludes the state time trends, while column (4) includes state-specific time dummies (which is computationally intensive but produces very similar results). Column (5) includes only counties in state-years with death penalty legislation in place, effectively excluding non-death penalty states as controls. Each produces very similar results: capital convictions impose a significant burden on county budgets, consistent with previous estimates of their total cost. Applying this estimate to the total number of convictions during this period implies an increase in county budgets of more than $5.5 billion between 1982 and 1999. (As discussed below, however, one should be cautious in extrapolating equilibrium effects from these relatively short-run responses.) These costs are borne primarily by raising revenues. Column (6) reports the effect of a capital conviction on revenues raised by counties (excluding intergovernmental transfers, which are discussed below). Counties appear to finance these trials almost exclusively by raising taxes and charges.
There are several reasons that a log specification might be preferable. (As Figure 1 shows, expenditures are asymmetric, with a long right tail.) Table 4 In this specification I decompose spending and revenues into several broad categories. X it includes the log of the population, employment, murders, and crime index. 12 Here, too, total expenditures and revenues increase significantly with the presence of a capital conviction. The presence of a trial increases spending by 1.7 percent and the revenues that counties raise by 2.0 percent. Columns (2) through (5) estimate equation (3) for several subcategories of spending. While there is much more noise in the individual categories, judicial and corrections spending increases significantly (although not as much as total spending or revenues), while police expenditures decrease significantly. (Highway spending declines, but the estimate is only significant at the 12 percent level.) Why might police protection and highways in particular face cuts? The fact that this spending decreases is consistent with the stories told by local officials and the anecdotal evidence above, and may be driven by the fact that these funds are either on hand and more easily accessible (police) or more easily delayed (capital spending on highways). Delaying capital projects is akin to borrowing against future revenues. There may also be political factors driving these decisions -a reduction in services most visible to taxpayer-consumers may be the best way to motivate future tax increases. Last, police spending may be seen by voters as substitutable for judicial and corrections spending.
It is important to note that these decreases are less than 20% of the increase in total spending at the mean: the main way in which the trials are financed is through increased revenues to offset the increase in total expenditures. As column (6) shows, counties receive no net increase in intergovernmental revenues when they finance a capital conviction -rather, they raise revenues from "own sources" (column 7) to pay for the expenditures. Columns (8) through (10) decompose this increase into different revenue sources. Counties seem to raise funds primarily from sales taxes (for those counties that have them) and through charges.
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While previous research suggested that negative shocks to the welfare budgets of states resulted in cutbacks in other welfare spending, welfare budgets do not seem to bear the cost here. Spending on welfare, hospitals, and the like may be difficult to adjust in the short-run, because of more complex rules and legislation. This negative finding suggests that welfare programs are most at risk when jurisdictions face increases in spending on similar programs such as Medicaid.
One concern with this specification is that capital trials will represent a smaller proportional shock for bigger counties (and perhaps even a smaller shock in dollars if they experience a smaller increase in fixed costs). Table 5 presents the same estimations with the sample of counties limited to those with fewer than 75,000 residents and capital convictions in 2 or fewer years. These restrictions are meant to limit the sample to counties for which the presence of a trial represents a real marginal shock. Results are similar, although standard errors are larger (especially on subcategories). The elasticities of spending and revenues are quite similar (with revenue effects larger if anything), although this translates to a smaller dollar response at the mean. If anything, these counties raise revenues differently: they seem to increase charges by more, and raise a much smaller fraction of the new revenue from sales taxes (and indeed are much less likely to have a sales tax in the first place). Thus, the observed local reaction to these shocks is consistent with the predictions of the theory: taxes increase, with only a small offsetting decrease in spending. There is little evidence of a "flypaper effect" here.
The "cost" (and "benefit") of obtaining a capital conviction may extend well beyond the prosecuting county's borders. There are many reasons to think that one county's spending might influence another's, such as tax competition and selective migration (see Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993 , and Besley and Case, 1995 , Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001 . If one county raises its taxes it may enable the voters of a neighboring county to raise taxes (and thereby expenditures) without fear of high-income taxpayers moving out of the jurisdiction. Thus, estimating the full budgetary implication of these trials requires an examination of spillovers to other counties.
These spillovers are difficult to estimate, however, because an OLS regression of one county's spending on that of its neighbors could be biased by omitted controls for local political and economic conditions, correlated mismeasurement, and the like. If capital convictions significantly increase spending and tax rates, we can use this as an exogenous source of variation to examine the jurisdictional spillover effects.
(4) Table 6 shows both OLS and IV estimates of spillovers between neighboring counties, where neighboring counties' revenues are instrumented with the presence of neighbors' capital convictions. In these estimates, a county's "neighbor" is the population-weighted average of geographically contiguous counties, but there are certainly other measure of "neighborliness" that would be equally reasonable.
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The OLS results suggest that a 10 percent increase in neighbors' revenues induces a 1.8 percent increase in own revenues and a 1.7 percent increase in own spending. These results are slightly lower than most estimates of state-to-state spillovers discussed above, but are consistent with the literature in general. The IV results are slightly higher, with elasticities of .21 for revenues and .27 for expenditures, and are measured quite precisely. The inclusion of these terms does not substantially change the estimated effects of a county's own capital convictions. Interestingly, the spillovers for small counties are quite similar as well. From this analysis we learn that county spending and revenue decisions have significant spillovers to neighboring jurisdictions, even when the potential endogeneity of neighbors' budget decisions is taken into account.
One limitation of these results is that I am unable to model the dynamic process by which counties adjust to the presence of a capital conviction, or what county budgets would look like in the absence of the possibility of capital convictions in the future. 15 For example, counties may anticipate the possibility of future trials, even if they cannot know the timing of the event, and change their steady-state spending and revenues in light of the expected value of future costs. Thus, from this analysis, we cannot easily infer the long-run equilibrium costs of capital punishment. We can, however, see the fiscal consequences of a particular shock over several years.
V. CONCLUSION
This project explores the effects of the large negative shock to county budgets posed by the presence of a capital crime trial, first to understand the real incidence of these capital conviction costs and second to analyze the effects of local fiscal distress on the level and distribution of public spending and revenues. Analysis shows that counties bear the large and unexpected burden of capital convictions in part by raising taxes and in part by decreasing expenditures on police, while health and welfare spending seem to be maintained. The estimated increase in (short-run) taxes and expenditures is significant, amounting to more than $5.5 billion during the 20-year period. This is true for large and small counties alike. These convictions have effects beyond county borders, consistent with the literature on local spillovers and "yardstick competition": using capital 15 The analysis discussed above suggests that the biggest impact of these trials is in the first two years and that spending then returns to pre-trial levels, but a more sophisticated econometric approach is required to separate out noise in the timing of the expense from a dynamic adjustment process. Unfortunately, adding additional leads or lags of the death conviction variable reduces the number of years available, making a more dynamic analysis difficult with the current limited time span. Another potential measure of the longer-term effect on county financial health is county bond ratings. Unfortunately, there is very little within-county variability of bond ratings during this period (as measured by Moody's ratings, for example), and many counties receive no rating at all, even if they issue bonds.
convictions as an instrument for neighboring counties' spending and revenues shows the presence of significant inter-jurisdictional spillovers (while abstracting from correlated economic conditions and the like). These results suggest that there could be a role for state "insurance" pools. This analysis points to several interesting extensions. First, we could see which factors, such as demographics, affect the ways in which counties respond to such shocks. Second, the presence of a capital conviction could be an instrument for several endogenous right-hand side variables of interest. For example, since the convictions appear to affect taxes and police expenditures, they could serve as an instrument to examine the effect of property taxes on inter-county mobility or the effect of policing on crime.
As states and localities are given greater control over public funds, the distribution of spending and the well-being of residents will increasingly depend on the way states and localities accommodate shocks, their ability to shift funds between budget categories, and on the spillover effects of shocks within and between jurisdictions. Only through understanding the reactions of state and local governments to different fiscal conditions can we gauge the effectiveness and equity of the local provision of important safety net programs and infrastructure, both in terms of the distribution and the stability of resources. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and log of the population, murder rate, density, employment rate, and uniform crime report index. 
Revenues
All regressions include state and year fixed effects and log of the population, murder rate, density, employment rate, and uniform crime report index.
Expenditures
County spending data come from the Census and Survey of Governments, 1980 to 1999, measured in real thousands of $2000. 
Expenditures Revenues
County Spending data come from the Census and Survey of Governments, 1980 to 1999, measured in real thousands of $2000. 
County spending data come from the Census and Survey of Governments, 1980 to 1999, measured in real thousands of $2000. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and log of the population, murder rate, density, employment rate, and uniform crime report index.
Counties with Population <75,000 and Capital Convictions in 2 or Fewer Years
Number of Death Penalty Convictions (in period t and t+1)
